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1Summary
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its invasion of eastern Ukraine unified the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and prompted the allies to beef 
up defenses. But the process of strengthening the alliance’s Eastern flank is far 
from over. To complete it, NATO needs to develop a comprehensive, long-term 
strategy toward Russia based on unity, deterrence, and resilience. That effort 
is long overdue.
Much Unfinished Business
• NATO countries are divided in their assessments of the Russia threat, 
principally whether Russia would invade any of the Baltic states—Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania—on the front line of the alliance’s Eastern flank. 
NATO has opted for modest rotating deployments to this region, with 
questionable deterrence value.
• Southern member states believe that NATO is not doing enough to bolster 
their security in contrast to what it is doing in the East. This weakens the 
alliance’s sense of solidarity and cohesion.
• NATO faces logistical challenges in moving troops, tanks, and equipment 
across Europe to the Eastern flank. 
• The alliance has long recognized that it needs to be resilient at home to 
prevail in a conflict, but it has not applied that philosophy to cyber vulner-
abilities. Whether it be transportation networks, energy grids, or hospitals, 
member states’ infrastructure is vulnerable. 
• NATO’s relations with Russia are based on the twenty-year-old NATO-
Russia Founding Act, which allows for some dialogue in the NATO-Russia 
Council. But the geostrategic environment has radically changed, making 
the Founding Act anachronistic. Germany in particular remains unwilling 
to review the act, and there is silence in the alliance about other options. 
• The U.S. dedication to defending NATO’s Eastern flank seems unequivo-
cal, but some member states remain nervous about that commitment.
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Recommendations for NATO
Agree to a Russia strategy. This includes having a frank and detailed discus-
sion about long-term strategy, reconciling member states’ different schools, and 
addressing the hybrid and cyber security threats. 
 
Consider permanently basing troops in the Baltic states and Poland. The 
present arrangements are too easy to dismantle. NATO’s Eastern flank mem-
bers need permanent reassurance.
Establish a Military Schengen. Such an agreement would allow troops, aircraft, 
tanks, trains, and equipment to cross unhindered to the Eastern flank countries.
Revise the NATO-Russia Founding Act, or scrap it and present new 
options. It may be the only accord between the alliance and Moscow, but that 
shouldn’t mean it must be retained. The Founding Act and the NATO-Russia 
Council have run their course.
3NATO’s Challenge
Three years after Russia’s invasion of the Donbas region in Ukraine, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has greatly strengthened its position on 
its Eastern border. Most visibly, thousands of new (mostly Western) troops are 
posted on the border with Russia. 
This is a success story in many ways. Few would have expected the German 
and Lithuanian views, for example, to ever align given their historical differ-
ences over Russia and the legacy of World War II. But such was the galva-
nizing effect of Moscow’s aggression that the allies agreed in 2014 to double 
NATO’s rapid reaction force, create an even faster Very High Readiness Joint 
Task Force, and increase defense budgets to 2 percent of GDP by 2024.1 After a 
three-year absence, the United States has returned its bat-
tle tanks to the continent—and this time to Poland,2 close 
to Russia, rather than to the safe confines of Germany.3 
However, even allied officials admit that the task of 
deterring Moscow is a work in progress. And in some 
regards, all of the remaining steps will be more difficult 
than the ones before. Some are highly political. There are 
disagreements in NATO about permanently basing troops 
on its Eastern flank. At the moment, troops are rotated. NATO countries are 
still not united in their assessments of the nature of the Russia threat and 
indeed whether Russia would invade any of the three Baltic states—Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, the frontline countries on the Eastern flank. NATO 
too has to agree about how far it can go in finding ways to deal with cyber and 
hybrid warfare that straddle military and civilian responsibilities. 
Then there are the logistical challenges facing the alliance. Moving troops, 
tanks, and equipment across Europe is not as easy as it was during the Cold 
War era. Then, NATO had a seamless geographic reach to the Eastern terri-
tory of the former West Germany. It could crisscross Western Europe’s bor-
ders free of controls and bureaucratic obstacles. Those arrangements were 
discarded after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Now NATO has to 
revive them. As if these challenges were not enough, alliance members have to 
find a way for the reinforcements on their Eastern flank to overcome Russia’s 
air and missile forces. 
Though there are differing views among 
NATO members about how to beef up the 
Eastern flank, the political consensus—that 
the flank has to be defended—has held.
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Though there are differing views among NATO members about how to 
beef up the Eastern flank, the political consensus—that the flank has to be 
defended—has held. But that political consensus could fray as the memory of 
Russia’s war on Ukraine fades or indeed if Russia withdraws its support com-
pletely from Donbas, which at the moment is highly unlikely.
To finish the task along its Eastern flank, NATO needs to agree to a Russia 
strategy based on unity, deterrence, and resilience. That means figuring out 
how to maintain the consensus over Russia and dealing with the range of chal-
lenges presented by Russia on the Eastern flank.
Shaky Agreement on Bolstering Defenses
At NATO’s 2014 Wales summit—the first after Russia’s aggression—there was 
a consensus that the Eastern flank had to be defended. But the agreement on 
the extent of that defense was fragile. Member states could only approve a 
modest increase in presence in the East, in the shape of small forward-based 
planning teams. It took NATO allies time to implement those defensive mea-
sures because of the logistical, military, and political preparations required. 
They needed to get reacquainted with the idea of defending their own territory. 
It took another two years and another summit—in Warsaw in 2016—to 
adopt new and more robust measures. There, NATO leaders agreed to estab-
lish an enhanced forward presence (EFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland. It was supposed to “unambiguously demonstrate, as part of our overall 
posture, allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an 
immediate Allied response to any aggression,” according to the communiqué.4
In practice, the EFP consists of multinational forces, led by framework 
nations on a voluntary and sustainable basis. This overall strategy for the 
Eastern flank is centered on deterrence, defense, and a “meaningful dialogue 
and engagement with Russia.” The latter, the communiqué stated, “will not 
come at the expense of ensuring NATO’s credible deterrence and defence.”
By the summer of 2017, NATO had a total of 4,530 troops on the border with 
Russia grouped under four battlegroups. They were led by Germany (operating 
in Lithuania), the United States (Poland), the United Kingdom (Estonia), and 
Canada (Latvia).5 None is based permanently in these countries. Instead, they 
are rotated. The details prescribed by the current EFP arrangements and an old 
agreement NATO made with Russia in 1997 when the geostrategic environ-
ment was far less hostile means that troops have to be constantly on the move. 
Because they cannot (yet) be based permanently in these countries, the costs of 
moving personnel and equipment back and forth are high. Such an approach 
is expensive, and it prevents an esprit de corps from developing. It slows down 
interoperability that ensures troops from different countries with very different 
weapons and training systems can work together.
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There were mixed views in NATO about the agreed-upon level of deterrence, 
to say nothing of permanent deployment. One view regards the EFP as an 
essentially symbolic measure—too small to deter Russia, 
but at least the allies had put something in place to show 
their solidarity and commitment to their Eastern flank.6 
Proponents of this view point out that Russian forces 
could reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga, the capi-
tals of Estonia and Latvia respectively, in sixty hours.7 In 
that case, NATO would have to invoke its mutual defense 
clause, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, obliging it to militarily assist its 
allies who were under attack. That would mean going to war with Russia.8 
The EFP’s critics argue that instead, NATO should have adopted the so-
called deterrence-by-denial approach. That would mean a serious upgrade of 
the EFP, involving seven brigades, three of them heavily armored, that would 
be supported by airpower and other defenses. 
But that view misreads the purpose of the EFP, at least from the viewpoint 
of EFP supporters. NATO assumes—although that assumption is conditioned 
by the geographical location of the member state that might fear it will be 
attacked—that a deliberate, all-out Russian offensive is improbable. The EFP 
is designed for the more likely cases when a relatively smaller skirmish, pos-
sibly unintended, but also possibly provocative to test NATO’s reaction, might 
threaten to spill into a larger war. NATO’s forward presence is meant to dis-
courage Russia from escalating in such cases, and to give Moscow reasons to 
seek a nonmilitary solution. 
The EFP discourages escalation by signaling that should the Russian side 
intrude, it would run into—and would have to run over—forces from most 
if not all allied countries. Such an encounter would make it very likely that 
NATO would respond immediately, and respond as a whole including—cru-
cially—the nuclear powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, who 
lead two of the four battlegroups.9 Well-armed and strategically placed mul-
tinational troops send that kind of message, while their overall number—less 
than 5,000—is too low for any offensive operation. This is important for pre-
venting Russian overreaction. 
Given all the pros and cons about the EFP, the arrangements fall short of 
treating allies equally. A permanent presence would show Russia and NATO’s 
Eastern neighbors that the alliance is serious about the defense and security of 
all its members. 
The Threat Perception Factor
Allies’ fragile consensus on Russia stretches beyond the EFP. Member states 
do not see eye-to-eye on a number of issues. There remains a disagreement 
about Russia’s intentions and its appetite for risk. Countries differ on how 
NATO’s forward presence is meant to discourage 
Russia from escalating and to give Moscow 
reasons to seek a nonmilitary solution.
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much defense is enough, and whether too much may risk spooking Russia 
into aggression. 
Some big member states, such as Germany, France, and Italy, are not con-
vinced that Russia would attack Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. They argue that 
NATO’s Article 5 would discourage Moscow from ever doing so. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Central European states 
counter that defense guarantees without the necessary forces, plans, and pres-
ence deter no one. This group has succeeded in pushing through the upgrades 
in the defense of the Eastern flank. But Eastern flank countries see the need for 
additional measures, both in terms of military presence and in the cyber domain. 
Germany, France, and other like-minded countries, however, won the argu-
ment that new troops should not be stationed on the Eastern flank perma-
nently, and that forces there should be limited in size and capability. The idea 
behind the limit was to signal an opening to a potential better future relation-
ship with Russia, and to allay Moscow’s fears that NATO’s 
deployments might be offensive. Neither have happened. 
Russia does not trust NATO’s intentions. 
Germany in particular has wanted to stick to the original 
spirit of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. This politi-
cal agreement says that NATO will carry out its collective 
defense and other missions “by ensuring the necessary 
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforce-
ment rather than by additional permanent stationing of 
substantial combat forces” in former Warsaw Pact countries.10 In a nutshell, 
NATO was not to deploy troops on a permanent basis in those countries.
The act allows for some dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council, or NRC, 
which consists of all the alliance ambassadors and the Russian representative 
to NATO. But that dialogue has rarely made progress. NATO didn’t trust 
Russia, so items on the agenda were superficial. And Russia believed the NRC 
was a mere talking shop, devoid of content. But since it was the only forum 
in NATO, both sides persisted with it until the Ukraine crisis. The NRC was 
suspended in early 2014 because of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its inter-
vention in eastern Ukraine. It was revived in April 2016 and has met several 
times since but with very little to show.11 Several NATO countries, notably 
Germany, want to retain the council anyway. 
Others have argued that the provisions of the Founding Act—namely the 
one proscribing a permanent NATO military presence in the East—hobble 
the alliance. They also point to how the geostrategic conditions in which the 
Founding Act was signed have changed radically. The Founding Act, for exam-
ple, obliges Russia to “exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deploy-
ments in Europe.” 
Yet it seems that no matter what defensive measures NATO takes on its 
Eastern flank, Russia reacts in its own way, launching persistent disinformation 
No matter what defensive measures 
NATO takes on its Eastern flank, Russia 
reacts in its own way, launching persistent 
disinformation campaigns in which NATO is 
accused of undermining Russia’s security.
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campaigns in which NATO is accused of undermining Russia’s security and 
holding military exercises on the borders of the Eastern flank. Russia’s persis-
tent opposition to the EFP is aimed at sowing divisions in NATO between 
the member states, such as Germany, where some government officials have 
argued that the EFP is provocative and the frontline states that argue that 
Russia’s reactions show why NATO should have permanent forces deployed in 
the East. For the latter, it’s not only a question of unity and consensus in the 
alliance. It’s about showing Russia that NATO is here to stay on the Eastern 
flank regardless of how the conflict in Ukraine is resolved or what happens in 
a Russia after Vladimir Putin.
At the same time, the provisions of the Founding Act were based on the 
“current and foreseeable security environment.” The security environment 
has greatly changed since 1997. So maybe it is time for NATO to update the 
Founding Act to take account of the changing circumstances instead of believ-
ing it is still an appropriate instrument to deal with Russia. The status quo of 
1997 has been eclipsed.
Southern Flank Versus Eastern Flank
Another area of disagreement pits those who prioritize the defense against Russia 
against those NATO countries that worry more about the threat of terrorism. 
No one in NATO disputes that the alliance has to 
tackle both threats at the same time. But when it comes 
to allocating money and resources to operations or com-
mands, the needs of the South and the East often compete. 
The United Kingdom and the United States see the threats 
coming from both the East and the South. The Southern 
countries—Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece—by virtue 
of their geographical location, would like the alliance to play a more active role 
in North Africa and the Middle East, where terrorism, migration, and instabil-
ity make NATO’s Southern flank vulnerable. They see these issues, not Russia 
or Ukraine, as the main threats facing them. Many of the Southern countries 
feel that NATO has already done all it needs to do to strengthen the defense of 
the Eastern flank, and it now needs to focus exclusively on the South. This is 
something from which NATO has shied away. 
In this respect, the alliance is too divided over what role to play on its 
Southern flank. It is not only because of the different historical and political 
interests in the region among the big member states, such as Turkey, France, 
or Britain. NATO does not want to become bogged down in any conflict in 
the South. Even if the United States did call for a NATO military engagement 
in the region, it is highly unlikely that the allies would agree. They saw what 
happened with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO military 
operation in Libya in 2011. Both caused major rifts in NATO. 
When it comes to allocating money and 
resources to operations or commands, the needs 
of the South and the East often compete.
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Yet instead of past experiences having the effect of provoking an open discus-
sion about NATO’s role in the region, particularly with regard to Iran, the allies 
have suppressed it. There is still an assumption in NATO that if the United 
States or another major alliance member were to put a sensitive issue such as 
Iran or North Korea on the agenda, it would automatically lead to a knee-jerk 
reaction—that NATO would be asked to prepare for some military role.
This reluctance to have an open political discussion applies to Russia as well. 
NATO is not devising any long-term strategy toward the country because of 
the different perceptions of Russia in the alliance. 
Dealing With Russia
On the day-to-day level, NATO has four policies with regard to Russia.
The first is transparency about exercises; giving numbers, locations, partici-
pation. NATO has consistently explained to Russia what the enhanced force 
presence in particular entails. 
The second one is maintaining some level of necessary communication with 
Moscow. NATO, for example, has repeatedly warned Russia about accidents 
when Russian fighter jets enter the Baltics’ airspace. There have been several 
near misses, one including a civilian aircraft. Defense ministers and senior 
military officials from individual NATO countries also try to keep a weekly 
dialogue with their Russian counterparts.
The third is NATO’s willingness to counter Russian propaganda in all its 
forms by spelling out the facts. NATO however still falls short in communicat-
ing its policies to a public beyond security, defense, and military wonks, even 
though doing so is necessary for explaining why NATO has to send troops to 
its Eastern flank. It’s even more necessary to explain to a broader public how 
Russia’s cyber attacks could disrupt member states’ crucial infrastructure, such 
as energy grids and transportation networks. Even more important, NATO 
needs to explain to a wider public that Russia’s aim is to break the transat-
lantic bonds between Europe and the United States and undermine Europe’s 
democratic institutions by supporting populist, anti–European Union and 
anti-NATO movements.
The fourth policy is ensuring that the consensus in support of the EFP 
is maintained if not increased. There’s no possibility that NATO would ever 
be able to match Russia’s conventional forces that are based in the exclave 
of Kaliningrad, sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland, or that can be 
quickly deployed to NATO’s borders. That is not NATO’s intention on its 
Eastern flank. Its intention is to ram home the point to its more vulnerable 
members and to Russia that the EFP is about upholding Article 5. The EFP 
numbers are not huge. But the arrival of the American M1A2 Abrams tanks 
to Poland in January 2017 cannot be underestimated.12 The United States is 
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now present in Central Europe. Russia has strengthened NATO’s resolve. The 
deployment of American troops and tanks might be enough to convince tem-
porarily those countries that wanted a permanent and larger presence to accept 
that the current arrangements might provide a sufficient deterrence.
The four policies are sensible and should stay. They show to the Eastern 
flank members that NATO is taking their security seriously. The question is, 
what are the right vehicles for executing them? More specifically, should the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act stay and if so, how it should be used? 
Even though NATO has stuck to the letter of the Founding Act, Russia has 
claimed that the EFP is escalatory, that it violates the terms of the act, and that 
Russia will retaliate. No matter how much NATO stresses that its presence on 
its Eastern flank is for the defense of its own allies, Russia regards such measures 
as provocative, offensive, and threatening its own security. Russia responded by 
militarizing Kaliningrad.13 And its Zapad-17 exercises in Belarus in September 
2017 were by sheer force of numbers designed to intimidate NATO’s Eastern 
flank.14 These actions raise questions about Russia’s intentions. For the Eastern 
flank countries, these efforts offer evidence that they need the EFP and its 
defensive posture. 
But there is little doubt that these countries would much prefer bigger, if not 
permanent deployments in their countries. Such deployments would ensure 
a U.S./NATO presence even if a political solution were reached over eastern 
Ukraine. For these countries, Russia is their permanent threat.
Given the limited returns on NATO’s investment into the Founding Act, 
it would seem logical to abandon it, perhaps along with the NATO-Russia 
Council. That would require consensus in the alliance. Germany and other 
countries with a historically softer approach to Russia need, if only for domes-
tic political purposes, to demonstrate that the alliance continues to try to 
engage Moscow constructively. If the NRC were scrapped, their support for 
further—possibly even existing—defensive measures in the East would ebb. 
The alliance has to choose: soldier on with an increasingly anachronistic agree-
ment in the hope that one day, NATO and Russia can find a constructive way 
to reengage; go back to the drawing board to devise a strategy for Russia; or 
work on an ad hoc basis with Russia without any formal forum or structure. 
One thing is certain. Neither the NRC nor the Founding Act can continue as 
if nothing has changed since the late 1990s.
Since there is no discussion about the future of the NRC because no mem-
ber state is willing to put it on the agenda and for now no member state has an 
alternative, then the council should be used in a more coherent way to explain 
the defensive nature of NATO’s measures. Even if Moscow will always choose 
to portray NATO’s actions as unwarranted and destabilizing, the serious 
military thinkers in Russia should be given some insight into what NATO’s 
Eastern presence is meant to do and how. This is because any military force 
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is potentially both offensive and defensive. Russia, understandably, wants to 
know just how much risk any new weapons and personnel near its borders pose 
to its security. If Moscow misreads the composition and purpose of enhanced 
NATO presence, it is more likely to overreact. 
The discussions about the size and shape of Eastern defenses are far from 
over, and NATO’s new Russia posture remains incomplete in other ways as 
well. Most importantly, troops deployed in the East need faster access to rein-
forcements and the alliance as a whole needs to beef up its cyber defenses. This 
is far easier said than done. 
The Agility Factor 
Multilateral institutions are not known for their nimbleness. NATO fol-
lows that rule—except when it functioned during the Cold War. At that 
time, NATO had a highly sophisticated and seamless infrastructure for mov-
ing troops, tanks, and heavy equipment across Western 
Europe. Bridges were kept in good repair. The railways 
played a major role in moving NATO and U.S. troops 
back and forth, as did airlines and the facilities at airports. 
The motorways and country roads were well maintained. 
Today, in some parts of (western) Germany, you can still 
see the speed limit signs for tanks. Those measures assured that in times of 
crises, fresh troops could be brought to the front lines reasonably quickly. 
But much of that preparedness eroded rapidly after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The European Union’s Schengen system, whereby people and 
goods can cross borders without checks and controls, does not apply to military 
equipment. Often physical impediments intrude. NATO Secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg described the obstacles in NATO’s way: “It was a lot of red 
tape, a lot of bureaucracy which we had to overcome to be able to move forces 
quickly across Europe,” he said. “What remains to be done, which is the next 
step, is to address actually whether we have all the infrastructure in place. 
Because one thing is to have as I say the legal right to move tanks or heavy 
equipment on the plane but the other issue is whether that plane can land on 
a specific airfield and whether there are roads or railways connected to that 
airfield which makes it possible to then move that tank further.”15 
Neither NATO’s rapid reaction force nor its Very High Readiness Joint 
Task Force considered these major deficiencies. The EFP brought those defi-
ciencies into stark relief. It is about moving sizeable numbers of troops and 
equipment across Europe, and quickly. And in the case of a conflict, speed, 
communications, and logistics will become imperative. NATO needs its own 
Military Schengen.
During the Cold War, NATO also had a dedicated command—the Atlantic 
command—whose main task was to plan, exercise, and if necessary execute, on 
Multilateral institutions are not known for 
their nimbleness. NATO follows that rule.
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short notice, the mass movement of reinforcements from the United States and 
Canada to Europe. However, the Atlantic command was abolished in 2003, 
and NATO has not exercised a naval operation of this sort in decades. What 
this means is that there is a major gap in NATO’s Eastern 
flank that leaves it unable to withstand intimidation or any 
attack from Russia.
Even if forces were moved across the Atlantic and from 
Western Europe to the East, they would face one more 
challenge—that of overcoming Russia’s forward defenses. 
That’s basically a network of missile sites, fighter aircraft 
bases, and naval ports that allow Moscow to engage NATO reinforcements 
before they reach the forward-deployed units. Overcoming the defenses is 
within NATO’s means. But doing so would require skills that have not been 
exercised en masse in a long time and dedicated weapons that may not be avail-
able in sufficient quantities. 
A NATO general, who spoke on condition of anonymity in late 2016, 
pulled no punches when he described the challenge before the alliance: “What 
we have lost is institutional memory,” he explained. “Now look where we are.”16 
The Cyber/Deterrence Factor
In addition to rediscovering some of its old skills, the alliance faces the chal-
lenge of adapting to new threats. Foremost among them: Russia’s information 
warfare—a strategy that current President Vladimir Putin announced after 
becoming prime minister in 1999. Then, Putin drew up a national security 
policy in which information warfare was a major plank. It was first tested in 
Estonia in 2007, when Russia attacked the country’s vital computer networks. 
Since then, Estonia has been at the forefront in trying to link conventional 
defense with cyber and hybrid warfare in NATO. 
And because Russia had tried to influence the outcome of the Dutch, the 
U.S., and the French elections, governments and independent civil society orga-
nizations are motivated to counter the barrage of fake news and propaganda 
spread by Russia. “Actually, there’s a solid consensus among NATO countries 
about the insidiousness and danger of Russia’s disinformation campaigns and 
its cyber attacks,” a NATO official said. “But it’s not just up to NATO to work 
against this. The nations must stand up for their values and defend themselves 
against fake news and all the ramifications of these Russia attacks,” the official 
added.17 As other NATO officials argued, the alliance has neither the means 
nor the mandate to counter fake news. What it can do is refute, which it does, 
the fake stories that it knows are sent by Russian bots and that directly tar-
get NATO. For example, emails were sent to the Lithuanian government and 
media outlets falsely accusing German soldiers based in Lithuania of rape.18
In addition to rediscovering some of 
its old skills, the alliance faces the 
challenge of adapting to new threats.
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In addition to measures targeting public opinion, NATO faces increas-
ingly more effective cyber attacks on military and civilian infrastructure. It 
has addressed the first challenge reasonably well by beefing up protection of 
its own networks. This step mirrors measures taken by individual allies. The 
German defense ministry, for example, created in April 2017 a new Cyber and 
Information Space Command that will eventually be staffed by 13,500 soldiers 
and civilians.19
More remains to be done. Individual member states’ efforts are improving. 
But there is little coordination among them. Also, NATO is still grappling 
with the issue of whether cyber security is a civilian responsibility or a military 
one. Furthermore, allies have yet to agree on whether to entrust NATO with 
offensive cyber operations in order to dissuade adversaries 
from attacking NATO headquarters and member states. 
And NATO has yet to seriously wrestle with the ques-
tion of threats to critical civilian infrastructure. This is 
about putting in place resilience measures, something 
NATO did well during the Cold War. Now, the vulner-
ability of power grids, transportation links, or banks could 
be used against the allies in case of conflict with Russia—
or any sophisticated cyber war opponent. The risk is that the adversary may 
seek to dissuade NATO countries from coming to the defense of an ally by 
threatening devastating strikes on civilian infrastructure. The capitals could 
be in effect forced to choose between upholding alliance obligations or risking 
financial chaos or worse at home. 
The alliance has long recognized that it needs to be resilient on the home 
front if it is to prevail in a conflict, but it has yet to apply that philosophy to 
cyber vulnerabilities, for instance by drafting strict standards of cyber protec-
tion for banks. The latter is a good example of the arguments taking place 
inside NATO about its role in protecting civilian assets and indeed about 
whether the alliance is up to a task that is becoming ever more complex. 
Inside NATO: Germany
Many good minds at NATO and in allied capitals are devising ways to finish 
the work of bolstering the Eastern flank. Their main challenge, in many senses, 
will be to find support among all twenty-nine countries for whatever solutions 
they propose. 
Similar such divisions in the past were usually overcome when the major 
allies worked out a plan among themselves. This is proving tricky, not least 
because of Germany’s domestic landscape. 
Under Chancellor Angela Merkel, Berlin has been immensely important for 
keeping the European Union together when it comes to renewing sanctions on 
Russia every six months. And Germany’s role in NATO and its role in the EFP 
The alliance has long recognized that it needs 
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cannot be underestimated. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has pushed 
NATO to develop formal cooperation with Russia. When Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic joined the alliance in 1999, Berlin wanted to reassure Moscow 
that NATO enlargement was not about undermining Russia’s security or posing 
as any kind of threat. Russia accepted that view, although with serious reserva-
tions. When NATO expanded further in 2004 following 
the entry of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia, tensions between NATO and Russia 
increased. It was not just because of NATO’s expansion to 
Russia’s borders. The United States under former president 
George W. Bush considered deploying the ballistic mis-
sile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic to protect its 
allies against any threat from Iran. Russia argued that shield was directed against 
Russia. Germany vehemently opposed the deployment of components of the mis-
sile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic because it claimed it was a pro-
vocative move against Russia. This opposition in NATO confirmed Germany’s 
ambivalence on issues related to Moscow. It did not want to antagonize Russia.
During her third term as chancellor that began in 2013, Merkel changed 
Germany’s position in NATO. She took a strong line against Moscow. She agreed 
that Germany would (eventually) contribute 2 percent of its GDP to defense 
spending, the agreed target for NATO states. And she supported Germany con-
tributing to the EFP. This cannot be underestimated. To have German troops 
based in Lithuania amounted to a huge political and emotional leap by Berlin, 
and also Vilnius, given the Nazi atrocities there during World War II.
As for what the alliance means for Germany, NATO is its security guaran-
tor. Russia’s consistent goal has been to split the alliance, often by tapping into 
Germany’s post–World War II pacifist culture and pro-Russian elements in 
the left-wing parties. Despite that, Germany’s commitment to NATO remains 
part of its defense, security, and political outlook. 
Even so, Germany’s role in the EFP surprised some of its critics. They 
thought Germany would block NATO deployments to the Eastern flank. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition of conservatives and Social Democrats 
had qualms about deploying troops along Russia’s borders. The older gen-
eration of Social Democrats in particular clung to its decades-old policy of 
Ostpolitik in which Berlin would do everything possible to reach out to Russia 
in the belief that it would bring it closer to the West and enhance the security 
of Europe. The Social Democrats were also still wedded to the idea of Cold 
War détente even though Russia had torn up the rule book that was based on 
the inviolability of borders.
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 
followed by its subsequent invasion of parts of eastern Ukraine put paid to that 
strategy of Ostpolitik, at least for Merkel. And Germany’s defense minister, 
Ursula von der Leyen, who belongs to the governing Christian Democratic 
Berlin has been immensely important for keeping 
the European Union together when it comes to 
renewing sanctions on Russia every six months.
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Union party, repeatedly spoke out against Russian aggression and how it had 
undermined Europe’s security architecture. 
But differences have never been far from the surface. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 
a Social Democrat who was foreign minister from 2013 to early 2017 (and who 
is now president), said NATO’s policies and exercises were saber rattling. His 
successor as foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has also opposed Germany spend-
ing 2 percent of its GDP on defense. In addition, Gabriel 
criticized Merkel and the CDU for submitting to the U.S. 
president, Donald Trump. “To double the German military 
budget after the Bundestag election is nothing but a sign 
to Trump that they will give in to their pressure,” Gabriel 
said in an interview with Germany’s Redaktionsnetzwerk 
newspapers.  “For me, this is a submission to the U.S. presi-
dent, as I would not have thought possible until recently.”20 
Gabriel made these comments during the German election campaign. There 
is little doubt that he was knocking on an open door. The Trump administra-
tion is highly unpopular in Germany. Furthermore, pacifism combined with an 
anti-Americanism particularly among the left wing has been easy to tap into. 
According to a poll the Pew Research Center published in June 2017, the most 
negative views of the United States among European countries are found in 
Germany (62 percent unfavorable).21 
For now, von der Leyen has successfully lobbied for and defended the gov-
ernment’s decision to lead the battle group in Lithuania, where Germany has 
over 450 soldiers. Merkel, who has been chancellor since 2005 and was reelected 
for a fourth term on September 24, has effectively changed Germany’s decades-
long policy of rapprochement with Russia by consistently defending the right 
of Ukraine, as well as other NATO countries located between Russia and the 
European Union, to choose its own alliances and direction. 
Yet for all that, Germany is unwilling to review the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act. No other options have so far been put on the table despite the fact that 
the geostrategic environment in which the Founding Act was agreed upon has 
fundamentally changed. Thus, the Founding Act limits what NATO can do 
on its Eastern flank.
Trump, Putin, and the 
Transatlantic Relationship
It was the former U.S. president, Barack Obama, who pushed hard for a more 
robust NATO presence in Eastern Europe. He went much further than his 
predecessor George W. Bush, who often saw Russia as a threat to the security 
of these countries. He had no reservations about NATO’s role and America’s 
commitment to its European allies. Donald Trump sees things differently. On 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 followed by 
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defense and security issues, there are troubling divisions in the Trump admin-
istration that make NATO’s European and Canadian allies nervous.
During the U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump said NATO was 
obsolete and that it was time the European allies paid their dues for America’s 
security guarantee. Trump’s opinion about NATO rattled the Europeans 
as did his uncritical view of Putin, not to mention the Kremlin’s role in the 
U.S. presidential campaign in which it allegedly hacked into the Democratic 
National Committee’s computers, among other efforts.22 For some Europeans, 
Trump was doing Putin a big favor by denigrating NATO.
In addition, Trump’s protectionist trade policies and his criticism of 
Germany’s big trade surplus rattled Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who 
rarely criticizes leaders in public, suggested Europe should go its own way. 
Whether for electoral reasons or not, Merkel spoke her mind in a beer tent in 
Munich in late May 2017 after a G7 summit during which she had had several 
discussions with Trump. “The era in which we could fully rely on others is over 
to some extent. That’s what I experienced over the past several days,” she said. 
“We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.”23 
Still, it is clear that the majority of European Union states are not prepared 
to pool their sovereignty when it comes to defense matters. Defense is still 
the remit of the member states. In addition, the majority of member states 
are more committed to soft power, not hard power. This could change in the 
coming years. In a major speech in Paris on September 26, French President 
Emmanuel Macron proposed that the European Union establish an interven-
tion force by 2020 without going into detail except to say that Europe also 
needed its own common defense budget, a joint civil protection force, and a 
joint doctrine for action.24 
His speech reflected an emerging consensus that the Europeans need to 
have a serious defense and security policy of their own. It may not be in compe-
tition with NATO, or mean that NATO will become redundant. The declared 
need simply reflects changing perceptions of the transatlantic relationship.
In the meantime, Trump has left his mark on the European Union’s 
Eastern and Central European members, who put their trust and faith in 
NATO. Many there were taken aback by Trump’s comments about the alli-
ance. They were even more worried when initially he didn’t openly endorse 
Article 5 or even mention it during the NATO summit in Brussels in May 
2017,25 though he did so on a subsequent visit to Poland ahead of the July 
G20 summit in Hamburg.26
Despite this bluster, America’s commitment to defending NATO’s Eastern 
flank seems unequivocal. In the absence of clear presidential guidance, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis has been at the forefront in reassuring the 
Europeans.27 Mattis’s visit to Ukraine in August 2017, in which he said the 
United States remains firmly committed to the goal of restoring Ukraine’s sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity, also reassured NATO’s Eastern flank.28 
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Some nervousness remains, though. Many Central Europeans point out that 
at times of crises, the president—not the secretary of defense—will have the 
last word on whether to send U.S. troops to fight in Europe. So far, the United 
States is committed to Europe and Article 5. But the idea that American troops 
would have to fight in Europe is at present unfathomable. Such fighting would 
assume that Russia had attacked a member of the Eastern flank.
It’s All About Russia
In practice, dealing with the Eastern flank is about NATO realizing that 
Russia’s attitude toward the alliance is not going to soften; that Russia will 
continue to use cyber and hybrid warfare to intimidate the countries of Central 
Europe in a bid to weaken the resolve of NATO; and that Russia, at least in 
the foreseeable future, will not withdraw its military and political support for 
eastern Ukraine. These are the parameters in which NATO has to operate in its 
relations with Russia under President Vladimir Putin.29 And since these are the 
parameters, the need for NATO to maintain unity and increase its deterrence 
on the Eastern flank are imperatives.
If NATO is to complete the task of bolstering the Eastern flank, more prog-
ress needs to be made in reconciling the different schools of thought among the 
member states—most importantly Germany and the United States. 
The concerns of the Southern allies will need to be addressed as well, 
though there are a few good solutions there. Most capitals concerned prefer 
that national or European Union action tackle the threat of terrorism and the 
uncontrolled flow of migrants and asylum seekers. They 
are understandably uneasy about NATO devoting most 
of its resources to a threat in the East that their popula-
tions consider secondary, but are simultaneously unwill-
ing to allow NATO a bigger role in the South. That leaves 
NATO with few good opportunities to demonstrate that 
it takes their threats seriously. The best the alliance can do is remain ready for 
a more substantive engagement, and make demonstrable plans for it, in case 
the opposition to NATO playing any significant role in the South goes away. 
Then there are those disagreements that revolve around the question of 
how much threat Russia poses. Geography and history dictate that different 
countries view Moscow differently. However, a better political framework for 
Russia, one that reassures all in NATO that the alliance has done its utmost 
to reduce tensions, would help solidify the consensus around further defen-
sive measures on the Eastern flank. That discussion can only take place when 
NATO is united, when its deterrence measures on its Eastern flank are cred-
ible—if not permanent at some stage—and when NATO increases its resil-
ience. In short, these measures are about NATO committing itself to the long 
term on its Eastern flank and recognizing that a cooperative relationship with 
Russia is not on the horizon.
Geography and history dictate that different 
countries view Moscow differently.
1. NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” September 5, 
2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
2. “Convoy of US Tanks Arrives in Poland,” BBC News, January 12, 2017, http://
www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-38603234/us-tanks-and-troops-arrive-in-
poland.
3. John Vandiver, “US Army’s Last Tanks Depart From Germany,” Stars and Stripes, 
April 4, 2013, https://www.stripes.com/news/us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-
germany-1.214977#.Wa--Z4pLeT8.
4. NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016,” July 9, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_133169.htm.
5. NATO, “Factsheet: NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” May 2017, http://www 
.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf.
6. Michael Rühle, “Deterrence: What It Can (and Cannot) Do,” NATO Review, ac-
cessed September 30, 2017, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/
deterrence-russia-military/EN/index.htm.
7. David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s 
Eastern Flank Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_ 
reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf.
8. A. Wess Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial,” American Interest, August 
12, 2015, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for- 
deterrence-by-denial/.
9. NATO, “NATO Battlegroups in Baltic Nations and Poland Fully Operational,” 
August 28, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_146557.htm.
10. NATO, “NATO-Russia Relations: The Facts,” June 15, 2017, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm.
11. Barbara Wesel, “Opinion: Verbal Slugfest at NATO-Russia Meeting,” Deutsche 
Welle, April 20, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-verbal-slugfest-at-nato-russia-
meeting/a-19202245.
12. Timothy Hughes, “Atlantic Resolve: First US M1A2 Main Battle Tanks in Poland,” 
U.S. Army, January 11, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/180520/atlantic_ 
resolve_first_us_m1a2_main_battle_tanks_in_poland.
13. Sergey Sukhankin, “Kaliningrad: From Boomtown to Battle-Station,” European 
Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/ 
commentary_kaliningrad_from_boomtown_to_battle_station_7256.
14. Andrzej Wilk, “The Zapad-2017 Exercises: The Information War (for Now),” Center 
for Eastern Studies, September 4, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
commentary/2017-09-04/zapad-2017-exercises-information-war-now.
Corrections: A clarifying sentence has been added to summarize NATO’s relationship 
to former Warsaw Pact countries from the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The 
NATO-Russia Council was revived in April 2016, not July 2017. And Italy has been 
struck as an example of resisting the enhanced forward presence as a provocation.
Notes
17
18 | NATO’s Eastern Flank and Its Future Relationship With Russia
15. NATO, “Pre-Ministerial Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg before the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of 
Defence Ministers,” June 13, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
opinions_132272.htm.
16. Interview with the author, February 9, 2017.
17. Interview with the author, August 23, 2017.
18. “NATO: Russia Targeted German Army With Fake News Campaign,” Deutsche 
Welle, February 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/nato-russia-targeted-german-
army-with-fake-news-campaign/a-37591978.
19. Nina Werkhäuser, “German Army Launches New Cyber Command,” Deutsche 
Welle, January 4, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/german-army-launches-new-cyber-
command/a-38246517.
20. “‘Nicht für möglich gehalten’ – Gabriel wirft Merkel Unterwerfung vor” (in 
German), Die Welt, August 14, 2017, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/ 
article167648887/Nicht-fuer-moeglich-gehalten-Gabriel-wirft-Merkel-
Unterwerfung-vor.html.
21. Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Jacob Poushter, and Janell Fetterolf, “The Tarnished 
American Brand,” Pew Research Center, June 26, 2017, http://www.pewglobal 
.org/2017/06/26/tarnished-american-brand/.
22. Nicole Perlroth, Michael Wines, and Matthew Rosenberg, “Russian Election 
Hacking Efforts, Wider Than Previously Known, Draw Little Scrutiny,” New York 
Times, September 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/politics/russia-
election-hacking.html.
23. Giulia Paravicini, “Angela Merkel: Europe Must Take ‘Our Fate’ Into Own Hands,” 
POLITICO, May 28, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-europe-
cdu-must-take-its-fate-into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/.
24. “Highlights: French President Macron’s Speech on the EU,” Reuters, September 26, 
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-eu-macron-highlights/highlights-
french-president-macrons-speech-on-the-eu-idUSKCN1C1268; “Macron Calls for 
EU Joint Defence Force,” BBC News, September 26, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-41403394.
25. “Trump Tells Nato Allies to Pay Up,” BBC News, May 25, 2017, http://www.bbc 
.com/news/world-europe-40037776.
26. Roberta Rampton and Pawel Sobczak, “Trump Criticizes Russia, Calls for Defense 
of Western Civilization,” Reuters, July 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
poland-usa-trump/nato-allies-look-for-reassurance-from-trump-in-warsaw-idUSK-
BN19R02Q.
27. “Secretary Mattis Joint Press Conference With Ukrainian President Poros,” 
U.S. Department of Defense, August 24, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1288808/secretary-mattis-joint-press- 
conference-with-ukrainian-president-poroshenko/.
28. Cheryl Pellerin, “Mattis: U.S., Ukraine Continue to Build Lasting Strategic 
Partnership,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 24, 2017, https://www.defense 
.gov/News/Article/Article/1288613/mattis-us-ukraine-continue-to-build-lasting-
strategic-partnership/.
29. Wesel, “Opinion: Verbal Slugfest.”

Carnegie Europe was founded in 2007 and has become the go-to source for 
European foreign policy analysis in Brussels on topics ranging from Turkey 
to the Middle East and the Eastern neighborhood to security and defense. 
Carnegie Europe’s strong team of scholars provides unparalleled depth of 
analysis and thoughtful, carefully crafted policy recommendations on the 
strategic issues facing the European Union and its member states.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global 
network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, 
India, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, 
is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh 
policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers in 
government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring 




O C TO B E R  2 01 7
BEIJ ING     BEIRUT     BRUSSELS     MOSCOW     NEW DELHI      WASHINGTON
CarnegieEurope.eu
NATO’S EASTERN 
FLANK AND ITS FUTURE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
Judy Dempsey
